[Article] Emotional Knowledge
Discussion: [Article] Emotional Knowledge
From the forum: Sam's Essays
This thread was started by: Glowing Face Man.
Discussion start time: 2010-02-09 03:41:51.
From the forum: Sam's Essays
This thread was started by: Glowing Face Man.
Discussion start time: 2010-02-09 03:41:51.
I'm pleased to see this topic being addressed. I find there is not nearly enough exploration of these notions. On reviewing your article, I am drawn to contemplate the epistemological differences between 'knowledge that' (propositional knowledge) and 'knowledge how' (performative knowledge). I am most accustomed to emotional knowledge being used to validate propositional knowledge. For example: I know that God exists (proposition) because I feel it in my heart.
In your example #2, a student of mathematics may well be able to read all about the truth of that statement, but understanding of the principle is ultimately performative knowledge (this is a generally accepted assertion, for which I acknowledge I am not providing any evidence). You third bullet point is a further example of that concept.
I would disagree with your assertion that proper walking is an example of emotional knowledge. It is certainly performative knowledge (can't be obtained by reading a book in the absence of doing) but is it emotional knowledge? If I assert that I strongly feel that I can walk, does it mean that I can? I would think not.
I would like to hear your views on the concept that emotional knowledge is used as the justification of a propositional assertion, as opposed to performative knowledge.
Further, I think we need to be careful to distinguish between a profound understanding of a proposition, and the emotions that may result from that, with emotions used as a mechanism for establishing a piece of knowledge in the first place (emotions to discover a truth, and emotions as a result of that truth).
In my understanding of Buddhist epistemology, the transcendent grasping of the truth of a concept is not an emotional experience per se (although it is difficult to speak of the experience without using emotional language). Because Buddhism, particularly zazen, emphasizes understanding through ultimate stillness of mind (a discussion of the Buddhist concept of mind might be in order) it seems counter-intuitive to use this as an example of emotional knowledge.
Your forth bullet confuses me. It seems you are talking about what some authors have referred to as 'cached thoughts' (http://lesswrong.com/lw/k5/cached_thoughts/). Something we accept reflexively, generally by regurgitation of something previously evaluated. I know what country I live in by looking at maps, talking to other people, travel to other places. If I feel very strongly that I live in France, even though I live in America, do I live in France? Is there any sufficiently high level of intense emotion that would establish it as true that I live in France if you and I are neighbors in Kansas? It appears to me that in this bullet point your are speaking of reflexively retrieved propositional knowledge previously established by evaluation (into which emotion does not play). One may well have emotions *about* that propositional knowledge, but these are resultant, not precedent.
Thanks very much for your post on this topic, and I look forward to your thoughts.
In your example #2, a student of mathematics may well be able to read all about the truth of that statement, but understanding of the principle is ultimately performative knowledge (this is a generally accepted assertion, for which I acknowledge I am not providing any evidence). You third bullet point is a further example of that concept.
I would disagree with your assertion that proper walking is an example of emotional knowledge. It is certainly performative knowledge (can't be obtained by reading a book in the absence of doing) but is it emotional knowledge? If I assert that I strongly feel that I can walk, does it mean that I can? I would think not.
I would like to hear your views on the concept that emotional knowledge is used as the justification of a propositional assertion, as opposed to performative knowledge.
Further, I think we need to be careful to distinguish between a profound understanding of a proposition, and the emotions that may result from that, with emotions used as a mechanism for establishing a piece of knowledge in the first place (emotions to discover a truth, and emotions as a result of that truth).
In my understanding of Buddhist epistemology, the transcendent grasping of the truth of a concept is not an emotional experience per se (although it is difficult to speak of the experience without using emotional language). Because Buddhism, particularly zazen, emphasizes understanding through ultimate stillness of mind (a discussion of the Buddhist concept of mind might be in order) it seems counter-intuitive to use this as an example of emotional knowledge.
Your forth bullet confuses me. It seems you are talking about what some authors have referred to as 'cached thoughts' (http://lesswrong.com/lw/k5/cached_thoughts/). Something we accept reflexively, generally by regurgitation of something previously evaluated. I know what country I live in by looking at maps, talking to other people, travel to other places. If I feel very strongly that I live in France, even though I live in America, do I live in France? Is there any sufficiently high level of intense emotion that would establish it as true that I live in France if you and I are neighbors in Kansas? It appears to me that in this bullet point your are speaking of reflexively retrieved propositional knowledge previously established by evaluation (into which emotion does not play). One may well have emotions *about* that propositional knowledge, but these are resultant, not precedent.
Thanks very much for your post on this topic, and I look forward to your thoughts.
Hi Tyrothus, glad you like the article, and I'm always happy to see people from the lesswrong community here :)
If you know where the term "emotional knowledge" comes from, that would certainly be good to know. I've seen it around but can't figure out where, for the life of me. It could very well be from Buddhist literature. Anyway, I don't think the "emotional" here means "having to do with emotions", so much as it's just used as a generic adjective to distinguish the knowledge from intellectual knowledge.
What exactly do you mean "performative knowledge"? You mean like walking/driving? (Nobody "performs" gravity) The way I understand the terms, that would be a subset of emotional knowledge.
To make sense of bullet 4, compare it with the statement, "Benjamin Disraely lived in Britain." These pieces of knowledge are structurally the same, and yet, the Disraeli trivia almost certainly isn't a part of your personality...
Thanks for the cached thoughts link... there's a lot of overlap between that and emotional knowledge, isn't there. Maybe that's the concept I've been trying to get at here myself...
If you know where the term "emotional knowledge" comes from, that would certainly be good to know. I've seen it around but can't figure out where, for the life of me. It could very well be from Buddhist literature. Anyway, I don't think the "emotional" here means "having to do with emotions", so much as it's just used as a generic adjective to distinguish the knowledge from intellectual knowledge.
I would like to hear your views on the concept that emotional knowledge is used as the justification of a propositional assertion, as opposed to performative knowledge.Took me a second to parse that ;) Hmmm, kind of like (naive) gravity? We have an emotional understanding of gravity because we've experienced it all our lives, and that justifies the propositional assertion "things fall down" (whereas Newton's precise *quantitative* law is far less obvious and falls strictly under "intellectual knowledge" for most of us).
What exactly do you mean "performative knowledge"? You mean like walking/driving? (Nobody "performs" gravity) The way I understand the terms, that would be a subset of emotional knowledge.
Your forth bullet confuses me. It seems you are talking about what some authors have referred to as 'cached thoughts' (http://lesswrong.com/lw/k5/cached_thoughts/). Something we accept reflexively, generally by regurgitation of something previously evaluated. I know what country I live in by looking at maps, talking to other people, travel to other places. If I feel very strongly that I live in France, even though I live in America, do I live in France? Is there any sufficiently high level of intense emotion that would establish it as true that I live in France if you and I are neighbors in Kansas? It appears to me that in this bullet point your are speaking of reflexively retrieved propositional knowledge previously established by evaluation (into which emotion does not play). One may well have emotions *about* that propositional knowledge, but these are resultant, not precedent.Like the "God exists" bullet, we're dealing with modal logic here ;) Of course, in a Descartes sense, we can't be "certain" of hardly anything...
To make sense of bullet 4, compare it with the statement, "Benjamin Disraely lived in Britain." These pieces of knowledge are structurally the same, and yet, the Disraeli trivia almost certainly isn't a part of your personality...
Thanks for the cached thoughts link... there's a lot of overlap between that and emotional knowledge, isn't there. Maybe that's the concept I've been trying to get at here myself...